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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työmarkkinoiden vaihtuvuuden vaikutuksia työntekijöiden hyvinvoin-
tiin. Aineistona käytetään yhdistettyä aineistoa, jossa on tietoja sekä työntekijöiden subjektiivisesta 
hyvinvoinnista että työmarkkinoiden vaihtuvuudesta rekisteriaineistosta. Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan 
ns. kompensoivia palkkaeroja selittämällä palkkoja ja työtyytyväisyyttä käyttäen indikaattoria sellai-
sille toimipaikoille, joissa on ollut korkea ylimääräinen työntekijöiden vaihtuvuus edellisten vuosien 
aikana. Tulokset tukevat kompensoivien palkkaerojen olemassaoloa, koska epävarmuus kasvattaa 
palkkoja, mutta sillä ei ole vaikutusta työtyytyväisyyteen. 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the effects of establishment- and industry-level labor market turnover on employees’ 
well-being. The linked employer-employee panel data contain both survey information on employees’ 
subjective well-being and comprehensive register-based information on job and worker flows. Labor 
market turbulence decreases well-being as experienced job satisfaction and satisfaction with job 
security are negatively related to the previous year’s flows. We test for the existence of compensating 
wage differentials by explaining wages and job satisfaction with average uncertainties, measured by 
an indicator for a high moving average of past excessive turnover (churning) rate. The results are 
consistent with compensating wage differentials, since high uncertainty increases real wages, but has 
no effect on job satisfaction. 
JEL classification: J28, J31, J63 
Keywords: job flows, worker flows, job satisfaction, perceived security, job instability 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firm dynamics – creative destruction – accounts for 20-30% of the observed productivity growth in 
economies around the world (e.g. Foster et al. 2001; Bartelsman et al. 2004). The creative destruction 
process entails simultaneous job creation and destruction and worker flows. This implies that there is 
a positive correlation between turnover in the labor market and productivity growth.  
Empirical research has also shown that policy measures can speed up productivity growth through 
deregulation that facilitates firm dynamics. There is evidence of positive effects on productivity 
growth from the deregulation of product markets (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003), the removal of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) (e.g. Autor et al. 2007; Bassanini et al. 2009), and capital 
market reforms (e.g. Aghion et al. 2007).  
Does this productivity-enhancing creative destruction process, however, come at the expense of lower 
employee well-being in the form of reduced job satisfaction? Indeed, one can easily envisage that a 
job in an establishment characterized by rapid hiring and firing may be considered to be worse than a 
job in an establishment characterized by slower worker turnover, because rapid turnover means more 
uncertainty regarding the future. Also, it is fair to assume that the whole idea of EPL is to decrease 
uncertainty about future job prospects, because such uncertainty is generally perceived as an 
unpleasant thing. In this paper, we ask whether changes in wages are enough to counterbalance these 
negative direct effects of turnover on employees. 
A faster pace of creative destruction is also associated with fiercer product market competition. In 
such an environment, the scope for employee shirking and superfluous on-the-job activities is likely 
to be smaller than in an establishment characterized by a low level of product market competition. 
Thus, a negative correlation between employee well-being and the pace of creative destruction may 
indirectly exist owing to the negative effects on job satisfaction from a high pace of work. Indeed, 
there is evidence that job satisfaction has declined slightly over time in Britain and Germany (Green 
and Tsitsianis 2005) and, at least in Britain, the authors ascribe part of this decline to “the 
intensification of work effort” (Green and Tsitsianis 2005, p. 423).  
The potential effects of labor market turnover on employee well-being are particularly important, 
because job dissatisfaction has been found to be associated with ‘negative’ activities (see e.g. Warr 
1999). These include lower job performance, an increase in absenteeism, more actual and intended 
job switching, as well as various discretionary activities, like less voluntary overtime, less prosocial 
activity and less adaptive behavior. All these are likely to increase the firms’ costs. From the society’s 
point of view, job dissatisfaction is costly also if it leads to early retirement or withdrawal from the 
labor market. These effects can erode the positive effects of reforms on performance through the 
increase in labor market turnover.  
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In this paper, we examine empirically whether a faster pace of creative destruction negatively affects 
job satisfaction. The results of this study also have a bearing on the debate regarding the existence of 
compensating wage differentials. Therefore, we establish whether or not employees receive 
compensating differentials. If the wage fully compensates for the negative effects of uncertainty in 
establishments or industries that have a high turnover of employees, then the uncertainties should 
have no effect on job satisfaction in a regression of job satisfaction on the measures of job 
uncertainty. This is because the wage fully compensates for the unfavorable job characteristics 
(Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2006; Stutzer and Frey 2008).  
The unique data set comes from a merge of two data sets. The first one is the Finnish part of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the years 1996-2001. It contains information on 
individual job satisfaction and various domains of it. The panel dimension of the data allows us to 
eliminate the bias stemming from unobservable time-invariant individual characteristics, such as 
positive personality. The results would be biased, if personality were related to willingness to take an 
insecure job. 
The other data set that we use is the Finnish Linked Employer-Employee Data (FLEED). This data set 
contains comprehensive administrative records of all labor force members as well as all 
employers/enterprises, including information also on their establishments with near-perfect 
traceability of employers and employees across time. We connect the data on establishments to the 
data on individuals and merge this data set with ECHP. Clark et al. (2009) have used a similarly 
constructed Danish data set.  
With the FLEED data we construct measures of gross job and worker flows at the establishment level 
and merge it with the individual data from FLEED and ECHP. We then estimate models for job 
satisfaction using these measures of labor market turnover as the main explaining variables. This 
allows us to produce information about the objective determinants of employees’ subjective well-
being. In contrast, as Hamermesh (2004) observes, much of the literature on well-being has correlated 
subjective measures of well-being with subjective responses.  
As far as we know, no previous study has examined the connection between creative destruction and 
employees’ well-being by using a nationally representative panel data set. However, there exists 
research that tackles similar issues. Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) directly investigate the effect of 
EPL and unemployment insurance benefits on satisfaction with job security for a number of European 
countries by using ECHP. They report that satisfaction with job security is negatively related to EPL 
but positively affected by generous unemployment insurance benefits.1  
                                                          
 
1 Theodossiou and Vasileiou (2007) explore the relationship between job satisfaction and job security measured 
in terms of unemployment expectations. Furthermore, Origo and Pagani (2009) examine the effects of perceived 
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The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the data. Section 3 provides a 
theoretical framework, based on compensating wage differentials. Section 4 describes the hypotheses 
and empirical specifications. Section 5 presents the baseline estimates and several robustness checks. 
Section 6 offers concluding comments.  
 
2. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The paper takes advantage of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for Finland, which 
is available for the period 1996-2001. The fact that the ECHP is a representative panel of the 
population is an important advantage. The estimates for narrow sectors could be subject to selection 
bias, at least to some degree, if the unobserved factors that determine whether employees choose to 
work in the sector also influence their subjective well-being.  
We use two measures of employees’ subjective well-being as the dependent variables. One’s job 
satisfaction status is an answer to the question on satisfaction with one’s work or main activity. Job 
satisfaction is measured on an ordinal 6-point Likert scale from ‘not satisfied’ to ‘fully satisfied’. A 
higher value on this scale means that a person currently feels more satisfied. Primarily, we are 
interested in the effects on job satisfaction, but we also present descriptive evidence by using 
satisfaction with job security as the dependent variable. It is an answer to the question: “How satisfied 
are you with your present job in terms of job security?”. Satisfaction with job security is also 
measured on an ordinal 6-point Likert scale from ‘not satisfied’ to ‘fully satisfied’. As is typical with 
the subjective measures of well-being at work, there is a concentration of observations toward the 
higher end of the scale for both of these measures. Thus, the mean values are ~4.5 for both of the 
measures of satisfaction. 
The fact that the ECHP for Finland can be matched to longitudinal register data, FLEED (Finnish 
Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data), is essential for our purposes.2 FLEED is constructed from a 
number of different registers on individuals, firms and establishments that are maintained by Statistics 
Finland. FLEED contains information from Employment Statistics, which records each employee’s 
employer during the last week of each year. Matching of the data sources is possible, because both the 
EHCP and FLEED contain the same unique personal identifiers (i.e. ID codes for persons).  
____________________ 
job stability as well as actual job stability (temporary vs. permanent contract) on job satisfaction. Maurin and 
Postel-Vinay (2005) study the determinants of actual and perceived job insecurity in Europe using the ECHP, 
and De Bustillo and De Pedraza (2010) perceived insecurity using another survey. There are also related studies 
(e.g. Vahtera et al. 1997; Martikainen et al. 2008; László et al. 2010; Rugulies et al. 2010) that examine the 
effects of downsizing, job insecurity and workplace closures on health and mortality. 
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FLEED contains both unique firm and establishment identifiers. Thus, by using FLEED it is possible 
to calculate the establishment-level measures of job and worker flows. We take advantage of the 
standard measures of gross job and worker flows (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). They are based on 
information on the employees in the establishments at the end of each year. The job flow measures 
that we use are job creation and destruction rates. The job creation rate (job destruction rate) rate is 
defined as positive (absolute value of negative) employment change divided by the average of the 
current and the previous year’s employment. The worker flow measures are worker inflow (hiring) 
and worker outflow (separation) rates. The inflow rate (outflow rate) is the number of hired 
(separated) employees divided by the average employment.3 The churning rate, defined as the 
difference of the worker turnover rate (the sum of worker inflow and outflow rates) and the job 
turnover rate (the sum of job creation and destruction rates) ties job and worker flows together.4 
Churning is a particularly useful indicator of labor market turnover, because it captures excess worker 
turnover, i.e. turnover that is not needed for achieving a given job employment change. For this 
reason, it is a natural indicator of the intensity of restructuring at the establishment level. 
In addition to the establishment-level measures of job and worker flows, we use the flow measures 
that are calculated for 41 2-digit industries. This allows us to identify different levels of labor market 
turbulence that could potentially have different effects on employees’ well-being. At the industry 
level we also use, besides the measures mentioned above, the excess job reallocation rate, defined as 
the difference of the sum of job creation and destruction rates and the absolute value of net 
employment change. (At the establishment level, this measure is always zero.) Excess job reallocation 
measures the magnitude of gross job flows that is above what is necessary to accommodate the net 
employment changes. Therefore, it is a measure of simultaneous job creation and destruction. For this 
reason, it constitutes a very useful indicator of restructuring at the industry level. To explore the 
existence of compensating wage differentials, we use the rates of churning and excess job reallocation 
as the explanatory variables to capture the labor market uncertainty that employees face.  
The annual flow rates are calculated for the non-farm business sector by using information on an 
employee’s employer during the last week of each year. The public sector (~20% of the observations) 
is excluded, because the employer codes are not as well-defined as in the business sector and 
therefore the job and worker flows would not be comparable. The job and worker flow rates in the 
____________________ 
2 To our knowledge, only the Danish ECHP has been previously linked to the longitudinal register data. Clark et 
al. (2009) examine the effect of co-workers’ wages on job satisfaction. Their sample size is somewhat larger 
than ours mainly because two more waves (1994 and 1995) are available for the Danish ECHP.  
3 Worker turnover that is reversed within the year (e.g. hiring a person in January and laying him off in 
November) is not observed. We cannot distinguish layoffs and voluntary quits, but their difference is not clear 
from the theoretical perspective, because employers can decrease workers’ wages in order to produce (voluntary) 
quits in the non-competitive labor market. 
4 Since an establishment cannot create and destroy jobs at the same time, the establishment-level job turnover 
rate is simply the absolute value of the rate of employment change. 
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Finnish private sector have approximately the same order of magnitude as in other industrialized 
countries including the U.S. (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1999; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2003). 
We estimate the models for the wage and salary earners aged 17-64. This produces an effective 
sample of ~7000 person-year observations for the period 1996-2001, depending on the specification. 
The exact definitions including the means and standard deviations of the variables are documented in 
the Appendix (Table A1).  
Table 1 reports descriptive evidence of the association between establishment- and industry-level job 
and worker flows and employees’ well-being, based on linear fixed effects estimation.5 The estimates 
for establishment-level flows point out that the previous year’s job destruction and worker outflow 
measures are negatively related to job satisfaction, but they are not connected to satisfaction with job 
security (Table 1, Panels A-B, Columns 1-2).6 Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that the 
previous year’s industry-level job destruction and worker outflow measures are negatively related to 
satisfaction with job security (Table 1, Panel B, Columns 3-4). 
==== Table 1 here ====  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPENSATING WAGE 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Assume that the utility of an employee depends on wage and working conditions: U = U(w,D,Z), 
where w is wage, D a measure of disamenity related to work, and Z all other variables that affect 
utility. In our case the disamenities are uncertainties caused by turbulence at the establishment or 
industry level. It is assumed that ∂U/∂w = Uw > 0 and ∂U/∂D = UD < 0. On the other hand, if 
uncertainty is compensated in the form of higher wages, we have w = w(D,X) with ∂w/∂D = wD > 0. 
The vector X includes the other determinants of wages, such as the length of education. Inserting the 
wage equation in the utility function gives U = U(w(D,X),D,Z). Compensation of the disamenity 
                                                          
 
5 We could measure turbulence also with other measures like the rates of net employment change, job turnover 
and worker turnover. To compress the presentation of the results, we do not report the estimates here. In any 
case, they would not be as informative as those shown in the table. For example, using the net employment 
change we would impose the restriction that the job creation and destruction rates have a symmetric effect on 
satisfaction. 
6 Using OLS, however, establishment-level job destruction and worker outflow are negatively related to 
satisfaction with job security. The (unreported) standard individual-level control variables largely replicate the 
well-known patterns from other countries. These results are reported and discussed in the working paper version 
of this paper. Table 1 also provides indirect information about the quality of the establishment link. An industry 
code is available for practically all individuals in the ECHP. Thus, from the number of observations in the 
industry-level vs. establishment-level specifications, it is possible to conclude that we are able to obtain the 
establishment-level labor market flows for ~95% of all individuals in the ECHP. 
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implies that, in the margin, D does not affect utility, i.e. dU = UwwDdD + UDdD = 0. This gives wD = 
-UD / Uw. That is, the marginal compensation of uncertainties in terms of wage has to equal the 
marginal rate of substitution of wage and the source of uncertainty. In a competitive labor market, the 
trade-off in terms of firms’ profits between wage and working conditions would also be equal to the 
slope of the wage equation.  
Most of the literature on compensating wage differentials has tested their existence on the basis of a 
hedonic wage equation: w = θ + φD + Xρ, where wage (or log of wage) is regressed on the usual 
control variables X and the disamenity variable(s) D (see Fernández and Nordman, 2009, for a recent 
example of this line of research). If the disamenity obtains a significant positive coefficient, the 
existence of compensating wage differentials is supported. We also present results with this approach, 
using as disamenities the establishment- and industry-level labor market flows.  
However, in this paper, the main focus is on an alternative way of testing for the existence of 
compensating differentials, which is based on the utility function (see e.g. Godechot and Gurgand 
2000; Helliwell and Huang 2010; Stutzer and Frey 2008). If utility depends on wage and disamenities, 
and wage fully reflects compensation for the working conditions (i.e. wD = -UD / Uw), then inserting 
the wage as a function of disamenities in the utility function should wipe out the disamenities. This is 
easily demonstrated in the linear case: U = α + δw + βD + Zγ and w = θ + φD + Xρ, where U is 
measured by job satisfaction and X and Z denote all other variables. Inserting the wage function in the 
utility function gives the reduced form utility U = α + δθ  + (β+δφ)D + Zγ + Xρδ. The existence of 
compensating wage differentials implies that φ = - β/δ. If this constraint holds, the disamenities D are 
wiped out, so neither wage nor disamenity appears in the utility function. Compensating wage 
differential can therefore be tested by examining whether the hypothesis β* = 0 holds in the job 
satisfaction equation: U = α* + β*D + Xγ* + Zρ*, where wage is not included. A significant negative 
coefficient for the disamenity would be evidence against compensating wage differentials. Note that 
the variables Z that affect utility and the variables X that affect wage can be partly the same. In this 
case the estimated coefficients of these variables would be combinations of utility function and wage 
function parameters. However, if we are interested in testing for compensating wage differentials, 
these effects need not be identified separately. 
Measurement of utility at work is not a trivial task. A natural candidate for it is employees’ job 
satisfaction. It is a typical feature of employee surveys that job satisfaction is expressed in an ordinal 
scale with a few alternatives. As has already been seen, this is also the case with the data that we are 
using.  
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4. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The basic hypothesis is that under compensating wage differentials, job and worker flows increase 
wages, but they do not affect job satisfaction. However, if labor market uncertainties are not fully 
compensated with higher wages, unfavorable aspects like churning at the establishment or industry 
level should be negatively related to job satisfaction.  
We estimate specifications of the following type:  
  ijkttkiijktijkt YUNCERTAINTY ελδαβ +++++= X           (1) 
where ijktY  is the outcome (real wage or job satisfaction) for individual i employed in establishment j 
in region k in year t. ijktX  represents control variables, which incorporate the standard individual-
level covariates such as employees’ age and education level that can be regarded as ‘the usual 
suspects’, based on the literature on job satisfaction (e.g. Clark 1996).7 Because we estimate fixed 
effects specifications, the indicator for gender is omitted from the vector of control variables.  
iα represents the individual-specific fixed effects. Lykken and Tellegen (1996) demonstrate by using 
twin data that 44-80% of the variation in individuals’ self-assessed well-being emerges from genes 
and upbringing. Therefore, the individual-specific fixed effects are extremely important determinants 
of subjective well-being. Also, fixed effects specifications are able to mitigate the problems created 
by the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, to the extent that they are determined by 
time-invariant unobserved employee attributes. In our case, the choice of an uncertain establishment 
or industry might be related to the unobservable characteristics. 
The variable of the interest is UNCERTAINTY, which is a measure of labor market turbulence. It is 
not immediately obvious how one should measure the uncertainties for testing the compensating 
differentials. We have seen above that ‘negative’ shocks such as the separation of workers from the 
establishment or the decrease in the number of jobs is negatively related to well-being. However, are 
these labor market flows the kinds of risks that should be compensated? The theory of compensating 
wage differentials point outs that average risk is compensated by means of higher wages. However, it 
does not imply that risky outcomes (ex post) are compensated. Otherwise, there would be a labor-
market situation in which a specific negative demand shock in an establishment would raise wages 
                                                          
 
7 The individual-level covariates originate from the ECHP with the exception that the establishment size groups 
are taken from FLEED, because employers’ characteristics reported by employees themselves can sometimes be 
unreliable. 
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there. Even average job destruction or average worker outflow as the measures of uncertainty would 
be problematic: firms with poor prospects are not likely to pay higher wages.8  
Instead, we use the measures that are related to excessive volatility in the establishment or in the 
industry, i.e. the rates of churning or excess job reallocation. To capture the average risk that 
employees face, we use 3-year moving averages of the establishment- and industry-level flows over 
the period t-1 – t-3.9 The first period t-1 is chosen to ensure that the flow happens before satisfaction 
is observed. As an alternative, we use flows lagged by one year. It is also likely that the impact of 
volatility is nonlinear so that small volatility is not reflected in well-being or not compensated by 
means of higher wages. Therefore, we have categorized the establishments and industries for which 
employees work as high-churning (or high excess reallocation) ones if the moving average of the 
churning (or excess job reallocation) rate exceeds 20%, following Golan et al. (2007). This cut-off 
point makes sense in our matched data, because the mean value for establishment-level churning is 
~24% (see the Appendix, Table A1). Note that the establishment- and industry-level flow measures 
are exogenous to individual employees. 
kδ represents a full set of indicators for NUTS2 regions. They pick up all average differences in 
employees’ satisfaction across regions. tλ  represents the fixed effects associated with the year 
(survey waves). The time effects capture any changes that affect all employees’ well-being in the 
same way. These indicators allow for the existence of macroeconomic effects, because they have been 
shown to be important determinants of subjective well-being (e.g. Clark et al. 2010).  
It is useful to note that we do not incorporate indicators for industries in the baseline specifications, 
because most employees do not change their industry over the period 1996-2001, which makes it 
difficult to identify a full set of industry effects in the fixed effects estimation. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level, because we have repeated observations on individuals.10  
 
 
                                                          
 
8 Cahuc et al. (2002) develop a dynamic model of firm-level bargaining that predicts that the higher the rate of 
job destruction within firm, the higher the compensation of employees. They obtain evidence supporting this by 
using a panel of French firms. An alternative argument is that job destruction increases unemployment fears, 
reduces bargaining power and therefore decreases wages. Campbell et al. (2007), and Hübler and Hübler (2010) 
analyze the effect of job security on wages based on this view.  
9 This is somewhat similar to Magnani (2002), who has presented U.S. evidence about the positive effects of 
industry-specific volatility on earnings, using the moving average of industry-specific shipment volatility as a 
proxy for unemployment risk. This is exogenous to individual employees as opposed to individual 
unemployment histories, which reflect largely unobserved heterogeneity among employees.  
10 We cannot calculate establishment-clustered standard errors, since employees who change their establishment 
over time belong to several different clusters.  
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Baseline estimates 
To explore the existence of compensating wage differentials, we start by estimating hedonic wage 
equations in which uncertainties are treated as job disamenities to establish whether employees are 
compensated by means of higher wages for facing labor market turbulence at the establishment or 
industry level. In the baseline estimates, we use an indicator for the high churning rate as the measure 
of disamenity. We use specifications that take into account the individual-specific fixed effects in 
linear panel data models.  
We find evidence that high churning at the establishment level has a statistically significant positive 
effect on real wages (Table 2). This shows that restructuring at the establishment level is beneficial 
for employees when it is more intensive than a threshold. The point estimate from the specification 
that uses the 3-year moving average of the indicator for high-churning establishments reveals that real 
wages are ~1.7% higher in establishments with high churning (Table 2, Panel A, Column 2). 
Regarding the quantitative magnitude of the estimate it is useful to note that Finland has a relatively 
centralized wage bargaining system, which sets restrictions on establishment-level pay determination. 
The system also leads to substantial wage compression.  
==== Table 2 here ==== 
To examine the effect of uncertainties on job satisfaction, we estimate specifications that take into 
account the ordinal nature of the satisfaction measure while using the panel dimension of the linked 
data at the same time. To include fixed effects in the ordered logit estimation, we follow the 
suggestion of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). They show that an ordered logit model with 
fixed effects can be estimated as a fixed effect logit (conditional logit) model, where the ordered data 
are collapsed to binary data with individual-specific thresholds. In our case, the recording of 
observations to “high” and “low” satisfaction is individual-specific, based on the individuals’ average 
satisfaction scores in the panel over the period 1996-2001. Only individuals with changes in their 
satisfaction status over time can be included in the estimations.  
The results show that high churning at the establishment level has no statistically significant effect on 
job satisfaction (Table 2, Panel B, Columns 1-2). Thus, the significant effects of high churning on real 
wages and insignificant effects on job satisfaction at the establishment level give consistent support 
for the existence of compensating wage differentials for uncertainties. We also find that the indicator 
for high-churning industries has no effect on real wages nor on job satisfaction (Table 2, Panels A-B, 
Columns 3-4). Therefore, there is establishment- rather than industry-level compensation for 
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uncertainty. (Although, of course, the insignificant effect on job satisfaction at the industry level is 
consistent with the hypothesis of compensating differentials.) 
5.2. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of the baseline estimates, we have estimated several alternative 
specifications. We briefly discuss the results without presenting them in tables. First, we have used an 
indicator for a high excess job reallocation rate as a measure of uncertainty. Since job reallocation can 
only be measured at the industry level, this measure is an alternative for the industry-level churning 
rate. Our finding was similar to that in Table 2: the indicator for high excessive reallocation was not 
significant in either the wage or the job satisfaction equation. It seems that it is the establishment 
rather than industry-level volatility that is the source of more uncertainty among the employees. 
Second, we have used continuous measures of the flows, in essence assuming that there is a linear 
relationship between the flows and wage or job satisfaction. The results on the wage equation 
changed, as the flows were not significant. Therefore, using the continuous measures we obtain 
conflicting evidence on the compensating wage differentials. It seems that taking the nonlinearities in 
the relationships into account is important. 
Third, we have also experimented with different sets of control variables and estimation samples. We 
have estimated specifications that include a full set of indicators for 41 2-digit industries. In addition, 
we have excluded the individual-level control variables (       ) from the models to examine the zero-
order correlations between the measures of labor market turnover and employees’ well-being, because 
the standard control variables of the models (i.e. age and education level) are strongly correlated with 
individual wages. Moreover, we have estimated models that include employee-specific linear time 
trends in addition to the individual-specific fixed effects, following e.g. Jacobson et al. (2005). These 
models control for any unobserved employee characteristics that change at a constant rate over time, 
which can be related to, for instance, career development. Also, we have estimated specifications in 
which we have dropped the smallest establishments (those with less than 20 employees) from the 
data. The turnover rates are much higher among them, so the results may be driven by these 
observations. The baseline results of Table 2 remain unchanged in these specifications. 
Fourth, we have estimated models that include an indicator for those who have changed their 
establishment during the past year to account for outside options.11 There may be a tendency for 
dissatisfied employees to switch from the establishments with high turnover to those with low 
turnover. This could lead to a situation in which employees with the highest distaste for turnover 
                                                          
 
11 We do not drop job changers from the data, because this would produce a biased sample. 
ijktX
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gradually move into establishments with the lowest level of actual turnover. Therefore, the estimates 
in Table 2 could underestimate the negative effects of labor market turnover on satisfaction. However, 
the inclusion of an indicator for job changers has only a small effect on the results. One explanation 
for this is that high average unemployment over the data period (~11%) has hindered employees’ 
efforts to improve their labor market position by taking advantage of outside options. Interestingly, 
the indicator for job changers obtains a statistically significant positive coefficient in most of the 
models. This pattern is in accordance with the results by Akerlof et al. (1988). They show that job 
changes generally lead to an increase in job satisfaction.  
Finally, we have explored the possible sources of heterogeneity in the relationship between labor 
market turbulence and employees’ well-being. The results remain similar for those with at least 10 
years of tenure. We have also estimated the models separately for those younger than 35 (but use the 
flow measures that capture the turnover among the whole workforce in the establishments). It is 
interesting to note that the indicator for the high 3-year moving average of establishment-level 
churning obtains a positive coefficient of 0.0357 in the wage equation that is statistically significant at 
the 2% level. This effect (~3.6%) is roughly twice the wage effect (~1.7%) for all employees (Table 
2, Panel A, Column 2). The insignificant effect of churning on job satisfaction remains intact for 
employees younger than 35.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Matching administrative records to individual well-being responses provides a natural way to improve 
the understanding of how the labor market works. This is the first study of the connection between 
creative destruction and employees’ well-being by using a nationally representative panel data set. 
Our novel interpretation of compensating wage differentials relies on linked employer-employee 
panel data that contain both survey information on employees’ subjective well-being and 
comprehensive register-based information on job and worker flows in the private sector. The panel 
allows us to eliminate the bias stemming from unobservable individual characteristics that may be 
related to selectivity to different kinds of jobs.  
We test for the existence of compensating wage differentials by explaining wages and job satisfaction 
with uncertainties. The baseline results show that high excessive worker turnover, or churning, at the 
establishment level is positively related to individual wages. We also find that it is not a statistically 
significant determinant of job satisfaction. Therefore, the baseline estimates provide evidence 
supporting the existence of compensating wage differentials. However, we find no wage effects when 
a continuous measure of churning is used. Uncertainty does not seem to have a linear effect.  
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The broader methodological lesson is that it is important to take a step further and use also the 
measures of job satisfaction to test the existence of compensating wage differentials. The existing 
literature on compensating wage differentials has almost exclusively used only hedonic wage 
equations to evaluate the hypothesis. Our findings may be partly related to the specific institutional 
characteristics of the labor market in Finland, which include a substantial wage compression. In 
another kind of institutional setting one might find stronger evidence.  
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TABLE 1. THE ASSOCIATION OF ESTABLISHMENT- AND INDUSTRY-LEVEL JOB AND 
WORKER FLOWS WITH EMPLOYEES’ WELL-BEING. 
 
Panel A: Job satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Establishment-level flows Industry-level flows 
 FE OLS FE OLS  FE OLS FE OLS  
Job creation rate  0.0230  -0.2824  
 (0.0308)  (0.2892)  
Job destruction rate -0.0969**  0.5554*  
 (0.0469)  (0.3044)  
Worker inflow rate  0.0182  -0.4236 
  (0.0326)  (0.2833) 
Worker outflow rate  -0.0989**  0.3976 
  (0.0475)  (0.2957) 
N 7173 7173 7555 7555 
Panel B: Satisfaction with job security (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Establishment-level flows Industry-level flows 
 FE OLS FE OLS  FE OLS FE OLS  
Job creation rate  0.0305  0.5183  
 (0.0373)  (0.3664)  
Job destruction rate 0.0121  -0.9624**  
 (0.0569)  (0.4134)  
Worker inflow rate  0.0002  0.6706* 
  (0.0390)  (0.3569) 
Worker outflow rate  -0.0513  -0.8071** 
  (0.0562)  (0.3974) 
N 7165 7165 7546 7546 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is job satisfaction in Panel A. In Panel B the dependent variable is satisfaction 
with job security. The job and worker flows are lagged by one year. The models in Columns 1-2 are estimated by 
using establishment-level flows. The models in Columns 3-4 are estimated by using 41 2-digit industry-level job 
and worker flow measures. All models are estimated by using OLS with the individual-specific fixed effects. All 
models include a full set of indicators for years (survey waves) and regions. All models also contain all the 
(unreported) individual-level control variables that are listed in the Appendix (Table A1). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 2. THE EFFECT OF ESTABLISHMENT- AND INDUSTRY-LEVEL UNCERTAINTY 
ON WAGES AND EMPLOYEES’ JOB SATISFACTION. 
 
Panel A: The effect on wages (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS 
High churning rate (establishment-level, 
flow lagged by one year) 
0.0136**    
 (0.0068)    
High churning rate (establishment-level, 
3-year moving average) 
 0.0165**   
  (0.0071)   
High churning rate (industry-level, flow 
lagged by one year) 
  -0.0051  
   (0.0068)  
High churning rate (industry-level,        
3-year moving average) 
   -0.0063 
    (0.0078) 
N 7185 7173 7185 7185 
Panel B: The effect on job satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE ordered 
logit  
FE ordered 
logit  
FE ordered 
logit  
FE ordered 
logit 
High churning rate (establishment-level, 
flow lagged by one year) 
-0.0432    
 (0.0725)    
High churning rate (establishment-level, 
3-year moving average) 
 0.0370   
  (0.0906)   
High churning rate (industry-level,     
flow lagged by one year) 
  -0.0747  
   (0.1043)  
High churning rate (industry-level,        
3-year moving average) 
   0.0670 
    (0.1078) 
N 5163 5160 5163 5163 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is real wage in Panel A. In Panel B the dependent variable is job satisfaction. The 
establishments and industries for which employees work are categorized as high-churning ones if the (moving 
average of the) churning rate exceeds 20%, following Golan et al. (2007). The models in Panel A are estimated 
by using OLS with the individual-specific fixed effects. The models in Panel B are estimated by using ordered 
logit with the individual-specific fixed effects, as explained in the text. All models include a full set of indicators 
for years (survey waves) and regions. All models also contain all the (unreported) individual-level control 
variables that are listed in the Appendix (Table A1). Note that real wage is not included in the set of control 
variables in the models of Panel B. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1. DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES. 
 
Variable Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Definition/measurement  
Dependent variables 
Job satisfaction 4.512 
(0.972) 
Job satisfaction is measured on an ordinal 6-point Likert scale 
from ‘not satisfied’ to ‘fully satisfied’ (the question PK001). A 
higher value means that a person currently feels more satisfied. 
(Source: ECHP) 
Satisfaction with job security 4.502 
(1.233) 
Satisfaction with job security is an answer to the question 
(PE032): “How satisfied are you with your present job in terms 
of job security?”. Satisfaction with job security is measured on 
an ordinal 6-point Likert scale from ‘not satisfied’ to ‘fully 
satisfied’. A higher value means that a person currently feels 
more satisfied. (Source: ECHP) 
Real wage 8.874 
(0.439) 
A logarithm of real monthly wage, deflated to the year 2000 by 
using the consumer price index. (Source: ECHP) 
Independent variables 
Job and worker flows 
Job creation rate 0.193 
(0.419) 
Industry-level job creation is calculated by adding up positive 
employment changes at the establishment level. The rate is 
calculated by using as denominator the average number of 
employees in two consecutive years. At the establishment level 
job creation is positive employment change or zero. (Source: 
FLEED) 
Job destruction rate 0.070 
(0.240) 
Industry-level job destruction is the sum of the absolute values 
of negative employment changes at the establishment level. The 
rate is calculated by using as denominator the average number 
of employees in two consecutive years. At the establishment 
level job destruction is the absolute value of negative 
employment change or zero. (Source: FLEED) 
Excess job reallocation rate  0.197 
(0.084) 
The excess job reallocation rate equals the job reallocation rate 
(job creation rate + job destruction rate) minus the absolute 
value of the net employment change (job creation rate – job 
destruction rate). It measures the magnitude of gross job flows 
that is above what is necessary to accommodate the net 
employment changes. At the establishment level excess job 
reallocation is zero.  
Worker inflow rate 0.312 
(0.417) 
Worker inflow is calculated by counting the number of 
employees who are in an establishment at the end of a year and 
were not there at the end of the previous year. The industry 
inflow is the sum of establishment inflows. The rate is 
calculated by using the average number of employees in the 
establishment during two consecutive years as the denominator. 
(Source: FLEED) 
Worker outflow rate 0.188 
(0.261) 
Worker outflow is calculated by counting the number of 
employees who were in an establishment at the end of the 
previous year, but are not there at the end of the current year. 
The industry outflow is the sum of establishment outflows. The 
rate is calculated by using the average number of employees in 
the establishment during two consecutive years as the 
denominator. (Source: FLEED) 
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Churning rate  0.237 
(0.238) 
Worker flow rate (the sum of worker inflow rate and worker 
outflow rate) – job reallocation rate (the sum of job creation rate 
and job destruction rate). It measures the magnitude of worker 
turnover that is above what is needed to accommodate the job 
turnover. 
Human capital variables 
Age <=24 0.108 
(0.310) 
Age <= 24  = 1, otherwise = 0 (Source: ECHP) 
Age 25-34 0.263 
(0.440) 
Age 25-34 = 1, otherwise = 0 
Age 35-44 0.291 
(0.454) 
Age 35-44 = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Age 45-54 0.270 
(0.444) 
Age 45-54 = 1, otherwise = 0  
Age 55-64 0.068 
(0.252) 
Age 55-64 = 1, otherwise = 0 
Married 0.599 
(0.490) 
Married = 1, otherwise = 0 (Source: ECHP) 
Basic education only 0.216 
(0.412) 
Less than second stage of secondary level education 
(International Standard Classification of Education 0-2) = 1, 
otherwise = 0 (reference) (Source: ECHP) 
Middle education 0.475 
(0.499) 
Second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3) = 1, 
otherwise = 0  
Higher education 0.309 
(0.462) 
Third level education (ISCED 5-7) = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
Self-assessed health 3.985 
(2.995) 
Self-assessment of health is scaled from 1 to 5 (top condition). 
(We have reversed the original scale of the health measure to 
emphasize that higher numbers correspond to better health.) 
(Source: ECHP)  
Employer characteristics  
Establishment size <=4 0.115 
(0.319) 
Size of establishment at most 4 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
(reference) (Source: FLEED) 
Establishment size 5-9 0.110 
(0.313) 
Size of establishment 5-9 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Establishment size 10-19 0.126 
(0.332) 
Size of establishment 10-19 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Establishment size 20-49 0.163 
(0.370) 
Size of establishment 20-49 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Establishment size 50-99 0.107 
(0.309) 
Size of establishment 50-99 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Establishment size > 100 0.379 
(0.485) 
Size of establishment over 100 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Indicators 
Years (survey waves) .. Indicators for 6 years, 1996-2001  
Regions  .. Indicators for 6 NUTS2 regions 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the establishment-level job and worker flows except in the case of the excess 
job reallocation rate in which they refer to the 2-digit industry-level measures. 
 
